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Operation Allied Force, the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 over ethnic cleansing 
in Kosovo, has been used as evidence for many arguments including the value of 
independent airpower and the use of limited force to achieve coercion. This thesis 
examines the bases of airpower doctrine and coercion theory, and examines Allied Force 
as a case of coercion. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), dominated by the United States, 
entered Allied Force without a coherent or complete strategy. Over the course of the air 
campaign, strategy eventually evolved to achieve the alliance’s goals, but this was only 
possible because of the incredible mismatch between the superlatively capable NATO air 
forces and the largely obsolete Yugoslav defenses. 
Allied Force conclusively proved that airpower alone can be used to coerce a 
target state to concede to diplomatic demands, but it also showed that the United States’ 
military and political leadership had little idea how to execute coercion. To improve the 
outcomes of future military interventions, it is essential that the United States’ military 
and political leadership devotes far more resources to strategic planning and analysis 
instead of hoping that operationally proficient military personnel will unknowingly arrive 
at an effective strategy. 
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In March 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched 
Operation Allied Force, an air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) to halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. By early June, Yugoslav forces began an 
orderly withdrawal from Kosovo, allowing the unopposed entry of international 
peacekeepers. Achieving its goals without a single NATO combat death, Allied Force 
was trumpeted as an “overwhelming success.”1 This thesis examines the strategy of 
Allied Force, and how the strategic choices were translated into operational efforts; it 
seeks to determine what the best course of action should have been and how to achieve it 
in the future.  
A. IMPORTANCE 
Since the end of World War II, all wars have been limited to some degree. Some 
have featured a limited commitment by one combatant but not the other, limiting the size 
of the war but not the intensity. More usefully, some wars have featured either explicit or 
tacit agreements to limit the scope of the war, the intensity of the fighting, or the means 
used. In the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union managed to fight for 
almost fifty years without overt violence between the two superpowers. Direct hostility 
was so limited that the Cold War does not generally qualify as a war, but it 
unquestionably featured coercion. 
Coercion is the process of persuading an adversary using threats; expertly done, it 
can gain the political objectives over which wars are fought with little or no actual 
fighting. While coercion has always been a valuable strategic tool, it has gained 
importance in the post-Cold War era as professional militaries are becoming more 
advanced but generally shrinking in size. With a small professional military, even 
successful military interventions can be costly, and Pyrrhic victories can exhaust nations, 
so strategists are more than ever wise to seek to achieve victories with less fighting. 
                                                 
1 “Message from Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry 
H. Shelton,” in the U.S. Department of Defense, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, 
(Washington, DC: January 31, 2000), page 1 of 4, http://www.DOD.mil/pubs/kaar02072000.pdf. 
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The only military force used during Operation Allied Force was airpower, and on 
that basis many insist that it was a successful case of strategic bombing. To substantiate 
this claim would, however, require a useful definition of the concept, but the U.S. Air 
Force defines strategic attack vaguely enough to encompass any target imaginable.2 
Although strategic results were achieved through airpower, established airpower doctrine 
is overwhelmingly focused on providing operational capabilities independently of armies 
or navies, and does not provide a coherent path from these capabilities to strategic results. 
Because airpower doctrine is limited to explaining the operational effects, this thesis will 
use the model of coercion to analyze the strategy of Allied Force. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is a case study analyzing Operation Allied Force as an instance of 
coercion. The focus will be the strategic level, although several operational efforts will be 
analyzed because they reflected strategic decision-making; this thesis does not attempt to 
optimize performance of any operational functions. The ultimate focus of the analysis 
and recommendations is not to establish a new theoretical model, but to add case 
evidence to a field that has been largely theoretical to this point. 
C. SOURCES 
There are a considerable number of primary and secondary sources available in 
English on Operation Allied Force, but most authors have notable biases. The NATO 
powers made a tremendous amount of information readily accessible: NATO press 
briefings are all available online, the U.S. Department of Defense and U.K. Ministry of 
Defense both publicly released reports on the conflict, and the NATO commander, 
General Wesley Clark, wrote a memoir of the conflict, Waging Modern War.3 These 
                                                 
2 “Strategic attack involves the systematic application of force against enemy systems and centers of 
gravity, thereby producing the greatest effect for the least cost in lives, resources, and time. Vital systems 
affected may include leadership, critical processes, popular will and perception, and fielded forces.” It is 
unclear what purposeful military action would not fall under this definition; United States Air Force, Air 
Force Doctrine Annex 3–70: Strategic Attack (LeMay Center for Doctrine, 13 August 2014), 2, 
https://doctrine.af.mil/DTM/dtmstrategicattack.htm. 
3 This thesis cites NATO documents individually, but the overall collection is hosted at 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/all-frce.htm.  
3Western sources are valuable for their sheer volume of information and have relatively 
few inconsistencies or gaps in the primary statistics provided. While crucial, they still 
require critical reading to place them in context, because they all come from agents with 
motives beyond the purely historical. 
A major weakness in the historical record is the lack of source material from the 
Yugoslav government or major third parties like Russia. Transcribed interviews with the 
Yugoslav general Nebosja Pavkovic, the Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin, and with 
Vladimir Putin all are available, but Slobodan Milosevic did not write a memoir prior to 
his death, and all Yugoslav government documents in English were obtained through 
secondary sources and have inconsistencies. Valuable for its scope is the book Milosevic 
and Markovic: A Lust For Power, by the Yugoslav journalist Slavoljub Djukic, who was 
not a member of the regime, but was present through the events that led up to Allied 
Force. 
Beyond the primary sources, there is a vast library of writing in the secondary 
realm, but most works focused on the military operation seem to come from a narrow 
range of organizations—most of them directly affiliated with the U.S. Air Force. Many of 
these studies specifically focus on the operational aspects of Allied Force and seek to 
refine—but not innovate—the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the Air Force. There 
is a strain of contrarian literature, mostly focusing on the lack of focus in the NATO 
strategy, which this thesis also addresses. In general, the secondary literature is 
segregated by source, with the Air Force establishment writing positively about 
operational airpower doctrine—as would be expected—and with more academic sources 
avoiding the operational details and writing less favorably about the strategy in Allied 
Force. 
This author has strived to control for bias in the source material, but is forced by 
availability of information to write primarily about the physical effects of Allied Force, 
rather than the intent of the participants. This limits the conclusions which can be drawn 
on certain points, particularly on the efficacy of coercive mechanisms which produce 
primarily psychological effects, but the overall results of the operation are still clear. It is 
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also appropriate, because explosions are much louder than words during warfare, so the 
effects of military action carry more weight than the largely-unseen intentions. 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. This introduction presents and describes 
the problem, justifies the model and priority of analysis, and delineates the sources which 
will be used for that analysis. The second chapter explains the history of airpower 
doctrine and coercion theory, explaining why they are each limited and why neither can 
provide a useful explanation alone. The third chapter establishes the relevant facts of 
Operation Allied Force, explaining the history of Kosovo and setting the conditions for 
the case analysis. 
The fourth and fifth chapters are devoted to analysis of Allied Force in 
operational and strategic terms, respectively. The fourth chapter analyzes operational 
mechanisms and assesses the efficiency with which military force was converted to 
coercive leverage. The fifth chapter analyzes coercion from the strategic perspective, 
establishing and evaluating principles and issues relevant to coercion regardless of the 
operational mechanisms used. 
The primary finding of this thesis is that Operation Allied Force was an instance 
of operational doctrine being substituted for coherent strategy. Though this substitution 
achieved effective results, it did so with great inefficiency and under the most favorable 
conditions possible. To improve the outcomes of future military interventions, it is 
essential that the United States military and political leadership devotes far more 
resources to overall strategic planning rather than hoping that operationally proficient 
military personnel will unknowingly accomplish an effective strategy.  
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II. RELEVANT THEORY 
Most literature on Operation Allied Force uses either airpower doctrine or 
coercion theory for the analytical model. Airpower, while a field of military doctrine, is a 
field still mostly theoretical from the lack of case studies unblemished by the effects of 
ground warfare. Coercion is similarly starved of cases where coercion was intentional 
and unequivocally successful. With no ground combat and successful coercion, Allied 
Force is a case highly analyzed by both fields. Because this thesis seeks to explain that 
success in terms of both schools of thought, this chapter will examine the roots and 
present state of operational airpower doctrine and strategic coercion theory. 
A. AIRPOWER 
Since the development of combat aircraft, there has raged a debate on their use—
independently, as airpower, or as a supporting arm to land and naval forces. The 
founding thinkers of airpower doctrine were military officers like Guilio Douhet, William 
“Billy” Mitchell, and Hugh Trenchard, all advocates for independent air forces. Initial 
works on the subject, such as Douhet’s seminal 1921 book The Command of the Air, 
were more focused on ensuring the funding and independence of air forces than critically 
examining how such air forces would practically be employed. Even today, airpower 
theorists tend to be air force officers, and their writings unsurprisingly focus on the 
primacy of airpower and the necessity for long-range bombers organized within 
independent air forces. This thesis uses current United States Air Force publications as its 
standard for current airpower doctrine. 
1. Independent from Land or Sea Power 
A declaration common to airpower advocates was that air warfare is categorically 
different from land or naval combat: Douhet insisted that “never before in all the history 
of humanity has there appeared a war arm which can be compared to the air arm.”4 The 
biggest battle most early air forces fought was for funding during the interwar period, so 
                                                 
4 Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force 
History, 1983), 179. 
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the most constant element of early airpower doctrine was organizational independence, 
rather than any principle of operational use. Operational divergence could also be 
explained by language barriers: although Douhet was an influential thinker, The 
Command of the Air was not fully translated into English until 1942.5 A partial 
translation in 1922 probably influenced Billy Mitchell and the U.S. Army Air Corps, but 
there was significant divergence from Douhet’s operational concepts.6 
Organizational dynamics remained a major factor throughout the interwar period. 
Three nations, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, all organized their 
air arms differently and all would have ample opportunity to put their respective 
doctrines into effect in World War II. By the end of World War I, the United States had 
four services with aviation combat experience—the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and 
Coast Guard—and their views of airpower diverged significantly.7 At the same time, the 
United Kingdom only had one air arm, the Royal Air Force, created by the merger of the 
British Army’s Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service.8 Germany, under 
the Treaty of Versailles, had no air force, but a number of German officers were busy 
devising airpower doctrine. These organizational differences, together with other national 
circumstances, would create visible differences in the doctrine developed. 
America and Britain had similar postwar circumstances of large navies, small 
armies, and sanctuary as islands. In America, Mitchell demanded an independent air 
force to defend against foreign air threats, and as an economical way to defeat enemy 
fleets at sea.9 The vastness of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans made this argument 
difficult, but the U.S. Army Air Forces would try to prove it when an enemy fleet came 
into range of land-based aircraft at the Battle of Midway. A total of sixteen high-altitude 
                                                 
5 Philip S. Meilinger, Airmen and Air Theory: A Review of the Sources (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 
University Press, 2001), 108. 
6 Ibid., 11. 
7 Robert L. Scheina, “A History of Coast Guard Aviation,” Commandant’s Bulletin 21–86 (October 
10, 1986): 13, http://www.uscg.mil/history/articles/CGAviation.pdf.  
8 Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American 
Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 34. 
9 William Mitchell, “The Development of Air Power,” in The Impact of Air Power: National Security 
and World Politics, ed. Eugene M. Emme (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand, 1959), 171–72. 
7attacks by B-17s and a torpedo attack by B-26s caused virtually no damage; Navy dive 
bombers would prove themselves far more lethal against enemy ships.10 Even before this 
opportunity for the Army to attack an enemy navy, organizational politics had kept the 
naval aviators firmly in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, and committed to 
service-specific tactical doctrines rather than the idea of independent airpower. 
In Britain, bombing aircraft had been able to circumvent the protection of the 
English Channel and the Royal Navy as early as January 1915, upsetting a centuries-old 
sense of safety.11 Even the limited capabilities of the German zeppelins and early 
bombers so alarmed the British public that the Royal Air Force was formed and given 
unified control of all military aviation.12 Though many in Britain subscribed to Douhetian 
ideas of offense—the oft-quoted phrase “the bomber will always get through” comes 
from a 1932 speech to the House of Commons by a former Prime Minister, Stanley 
Baldwin—this ideology moderated as World War II approached, with Fighter Command 
formed in 1936 and the introduction of Hurricane and Spitfire fighters in 1937 and 
1938.13 After the fall of France in 1940, the Battle of Britain proved that bombers could 
be stopped by air defenses, but it did not defeat the idea that bombers could have strategic 
effects independent of the ground war. 
Germany’s Luftwaffe, with very different organizational circumstances, produced 
much more realistic airpower doctrine. With their military limited by the Treaty of 
Versailles, rather than battlefield decimation or budget cuts, the Germans reformed 
deliberately, taking advantage of their reduced organizational inertia to build a balanced 
force.14 Beginning with Directives for the Conduct of the Operational Air War in 1926, 
the Luftwaffe published a series of comprehensive doctrine documents, largely echoing 
10 “Battle of Midway: Army Air Forces,” Naval History and Heritage Command, March 26, 2015, 
http://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/b/battle-of-
midway-army-air-forces.html.  
11 Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality, 21. 
12 Ibid., 34, 77. 
13 Ibid., 108; “RAF Timeline 1930–1939,” Royal Air Force, Accessed October 24, 2015, 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/raftimeline_19301939.cfm. 
14 James S. Corum, The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940 (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1997), 52–54. 
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Douhet’s principles, but in terms more aligned with the traditional German army than an 
independent air force.15 In addition to discounting the inevitability of bombers reaching 
their targets, German planning did not expect poison gas attacks on population centers 
and placed limited stock in terror bombing because effects on morale had been 
inconsistent during World War I.16 Between the doubt of Douhet’s absolutism and the 
dominance of the army in the German military structure, it is logical that the Luftwaffe is 
well known for its dive-bombing and other tactical actions. 
The Luftwaffe still espoused independent airpower, but the doctrinal realism that 
victory would come on the battlefield meant that bombing of the enemy homeland and 
rear areas was designed to erode military capability and military morale, not directly 
influence political leadership.17 The Luftwaffe’s execution of strategic bombardment was 
also hampered less by doctrine than by limitations in aircraft engines. Prototypes of four-
engine heavy bombers flew in 1936, but were so underpowered that the Luftwaffe staff 
tabled the program, intending to skip a technological generation and build heavy bombers 
when engine technology had matured.18 This technology gap, rather than doctrinal 
decisions, was what limited the size of Luftwaffe aircraft. 
2. Promises and Limitations of Technology 
The operational proscriptions of interwar airpower doctrine were based on 
generous assumptions of future technology. At the end of World War I, when Douhet was 
writing The Command of the Air, a typical bomber was the open-cockpit Caproni Ca.36, 
with a bombload of 800 kilograms, a top speed of 87 miles per hour, and a maximum 
range of 372 miles.19 From this starting point, Douhet imagined bombers bristling with 
                                                 
15 Corum, The Luftwaffe, 83. 
16 Ibid., 143. 
17 Major General Max Wever, “Doctrine of the German Air Force,” in Emme, Impact of Air Power, 
184; General Wever, whose first name is given variously as Walter, Walther, or Max, was the Luftwaffe’s 
first chief of staff, from September 1933 until 3 June 1936 (his death). This speech is heavily cited in 
Corum, The Luftwaffe, 137–140. 
18 Corum, The Luftwaffe, 172–73. 




guns and flying in defensive formations, as American bombers would fly their daylight 
raids over Europe in World War II.20 Billy Mitchell would make a similarly prescient 
mental leap, describing “aerial torpedoes … kept on their course by gyroscopic 
instruments and wireless telegraphy … in a sufficiently accurate way to hit great 
cities”—reasonably describing early cruise missiles like the V-1s fired on Britain late in 
World War II.21 These predictions were bold, but not impossible, showing the optimism 
of early airpower thinkers. 
This technological optimism logically carried over to one of the most basic issues 
in warfare—hitting the target—but with notably less vindication. Douhet’s imagined 
account of a future air, The War of 19--, included in the 1942 translation of The 
Command of the Air, suggested that accuracy was unimportant in terror bombing, but that 
the resultant carpet bombing would be mathematically precise.22 Elsewhere, German 
scientists worked to make precision technologically feasible with radio navigation, blind-
bombing systems, and research on bomb ballistics.23 In the United States, the vaunted 
Norden bombsight was coupled with a bomber’s autopilot to provide correction for wind 
and motion to the bombardier, in an attempt to “drop a bomb into a pickle barrel,” as 
propaganda put it.24 For all this effort, accuracy was dismal: on the American daylight 
raid against Schweinfurt in October 1943: only one bomb in ten landed within 500 feet of 
its target; the Butt Report of 1941 found that in night bombing only three of five British 
crews got close enough to their targets to drop bombs; and only one of five managed to 
put bombs within five miles of its target.25 Precision, while a desirable capability, had 
been given a place in doctrine totally disconnected from technological reality. 
                                                 
20 Douhet, Command of the Air, 346. 
21 Mitchell, “Development of Air Power,” 173. 
22 Douhet, Command of the Air, 347. 
23 Corum, The Luftwaffe, 112, 114, 174–76. 
24 “Norden M-9 Bombsight,” National Museum of the US Air Force, May 4, 2015, 
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/MuseumExhibits/FactSheets/Display/tabid/509/Article/196340/no
rden-m-9-bombsight.aspx.  
25 Ibid.; Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality, 1, 303 note 1. 
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3. Doctrine and Theories of Victory 
Early airpower theory tended to intermingle effects on material and popular 
morale, not separating different attacks based on their contributions to the strategic plan. 
Douhet insisted on “breaking down the material and moral resistance” of the enemy, but 
he remained vague in targeting guidance. 26 When postulating the psychological effects of 
bombing, he originally only considered the effects of workers fleeing war factories; in his 
later work The War of 19--, Douhet suggested that victory could come by putting “the 
enemy populations under intolerable conditions of life, making them sue for peace.”27 
After World War I, Douhet believed there would be no limited wars. He ascribed a 
“social” character to World War I, and believed that future conflicts would follow the 
pattern of entire societies engaging in the war effort.28 As part of this total mobilization, 
Douhet believed that the population would demand control of a nation’s politics and that 
a collapse of popular morale would bring defeat, regardless of military strength; citing the 
collapse of Germany in 1918 as proof.29 Douhet did not, however, propose anything more 
specific than terror bombing to replicate the effect. 
Later theorists did not deny the psychological effects that bombing could cause in 
a population, but neither did they focus on specific ways to achieve these effects. 
Unwilling to plan for poison gas attacks and lawless warfare, as Douhet had, most 
interwar air forces developed theories of industrial attack: either material destruction of 
factories or stymying war production by demoralizing workers.30 In Britain, Hugh 
Trenchard was highly influential as the first head of the Royal Air Force, although he was 
less prolific a writer than Douhet or Mitchell. In 1946, he summarized his principles of 
air power, including using a “strategic bombing force” to attack the “enemy’s means of 
                                                 
26 This translation uses the British spelling moral rather than the American morale; Douhet, Command 
of the Air, 175. 
27 Ibid., 188, 362. 
28 Ibid., 148. 
29 Ibid., 150. 
30 Douhet believed that “every convention loses its value” in a world war; Ibid., 309; Mitchell, 
“Development of Air Power,” 173. 
11
production and his communications.”31 This focus on destroying the enemy industrial 
base was common to American and British doctrine, leading to the Combined Bomber 
Offensive during World War II. This aspirational doctrine relied heavily on tactical 
assumptions and untested precision bombing technology, but it crucially provided both 
air forces with strong reasons for their independent existence during the interwar period. 
4. Adjusting Action but Not Doctrine
The Royal Air Force and U.S. Army Air Forces espoused precision bombing as 
World War II began, but both switched to area bombing—in effect if not in principle. 
The British were conscious of their switch, turning to night area bombing to compensate 
for increasing casualties and unimpressive daylight accuracy.32 These attacks, although 
known to be on civilians, were justified by considering “industrial workers as a factor of 
production…. Thus the attack on morale merged with the attack on the economy.”33 
American leadership remained committed in principle to precision bombing of industrial 
targets in Europe, but following the high losses of the October 1943 raid on Schweinfurt, 
there was broader use of “blind” bombing on instruments, and more incendiaries in the 
ordnance mix.34 In the Pacific, American leadership believed that “Japanese industry was 
so dispersed … that it was impossible to separate civilian from industrial targets,” and 
firebombing was thus a justified attack on industry.35 Despite this functional 
abandonment of prewar precision bombing doctrine, Carl Spaatz, the first Chief of Staff 
of the U.S. Air Force, espoused the same precision attack doctrine in a 1946 article that 
had been seen years earlier.36 
31 Hugh M. Trenchard, “Air Power and National Security,” in Emme, Impact of Air Power, 193. 
32 Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American 
Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 177. 
33 Richard J. Overy, The Air War: 1939–1945 (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 106. 
34 Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality, 228–29. 
35 Overy, Air War: 1939–1945, 107. 
36 General Carl A. Spaatz, “Strategic Air Power in the European War,” in Emme, Impact of Air Power, 
228–29. 
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5. Independent Strike Doctrine Today
Based on decades of experience and technological advancement since World War 
II, airpower doctrine still holds to many principles of the early thinkers; focusing on 
organizational independence and operational proficiency instead of strategic thought. One 
of the most significant recent works of doctrinal theory, Colonel John Warden’s The Air 
Campaign, specifically focuses on “the very complex philosophy and theory … at the 
operational level.”37 Written in 1988, The Air Campaign benefits from decades of 
technological development and combat experience that writings from Douhet and 
Mitchell lacked, but it remains centered on what aircraft and aerial weapons could do, not 
what had to be done to win wars. 
Warden discusses attacking the enemy’s will to resist in only one of his ten 
chapters, focusing almost entirely on maximizing the efficiency of air power in 
destroying military resistance as part of an operational campaign, not directly strategic 
attacks. 38 Warden concluded that “the will to resist collapses when the armed forces no 
longer can do their job or when the economy no longer can provide essential military—or 
civilian—services.”39 Warden felt that “direct attacks on the enemy civilian population 
may seem a viable way of breaking the national will” but that even limited success 
required incredible resources and caused massive collateral damage.40 
Official doctrine has no better focus on exactly how airpower will contribute to 
strategic victory: per the current Air Force Doctrine Annex 3–70: Strategic Attack, 
strategic attacks seek “to weaken the adversary’s ability or will to engage in conflict, and 
may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to achieve operational 
objectives as a precondition.”41 This definition emphasizes the ability of strategic attack 
37 John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press, 1988), xvii. 
38 Chapter 9: The Orchestration of War, benefits from more historical background than Douhet and 
other interwar authors, but ultimately does not make any clearer distinction between material and morale 
targets than previous writers; Ibid., 129–134. 
39 Ibid., 134. 
40 Ibid. 
41 United States Air Force, Strategic Attack, 2. 
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to bypass the tactical and operational levels of war (by flying over them), but does not 
make the strategic choice between attacking the enemy’s ability or will. Airpower 
doctrine clearly requires that air forces be capable of independent action, lest they be a 
mere auxiliary to an army or navy, but does not constitute a strategy. 
B. COERCION 
There is no shortage of literature on coercion and coercive diplomacy, far beyond 
the ability of this thesis to review or reconcile. Therefore, the sources of strategic theory 
will be limited to Thomas Schelling’s Arms and Influence, which effectively defined the 
field of coercive diplomacy during the Cold War, and Carl von Clausewitz’s On War, 
generally regarded as the foundation of Western strategic thought. Two studies 
contemporaneous with Operation Allied Force, Robert A. Pape’s Bombing to Win and 
The Dynamics of Coercion by Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, are used to define 
operational mechanisms. The intent of this section is to use those works to define the 
model of coercion and a consistent vocabulary for the remainder of the thesis. 
1. Roots in Clausewitz 
In On War, written well before combat aircraft, Clausewitz identifies the political 
and psychological roots of warfare, laying the groundwork for the eventual development 
of coercion theory. He could not, however, conceive of going around enemy armies—
rather than through them—to directly attack enemy homelands. Based on his military 
experience, there was only one variety of war: “an act of force to compel.”42 Therefore, 
while Clausewitz identifies war as “a true political instrument, a continuation of political 
intercourse, carried on with other means,” he derides a “rational” war in which “one 
would never really need to use the physical impact of the fighting forces”—the essence of 
coercion —as “war by algebra.”43 
Although he did not define coercion, Clausewitz did define the algebra that later 
theorists would expand upon, equating an enemy’s “power of resistance” to the product 
                                                 
42 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 75. 
43 Ibid., 87, 76. 
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of “the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will.”44 Later authors have 
expressed this in a cost-benefit equation, completing Clausewitz’s logic that “if the 
enemy is to be coerced you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than 
the sacrifice you call on him to make” and by extension, “the smaller the penalty you 
demand from your opponent, the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you.”45 
2. Coercion Defined 
Schelling, writing during the Cold War, expanded these principles into a game-
theory model of coercion as an independent strategy of international action. He defines 
two uses of power: the power to force compliance and the power to hurt an enemy until 
compliance is preferable to continued pain, making the difference between brute force 
and coercion the “difference between taking what you want and making someone give it 
to you.”46 He also laid the framework for how force would be used in these two paths: 
“brute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is most successful when 
held in reserve. It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make 
someone yield or comply.”47 The concepts of reserving force or of telegraphing future 
attacks would be utterly foreign to earlier theorists like Clausewitz, before nuclear 
weapons provided such an abundance of assured destructive power that some could 
safely be held back.  
With coercion now a viable course of action, Schelling defined the basic 
principles, identifying coercion as violence-backed diplomacy rather than a strictly 
military endeavor. Successful coercion requires the enemy to understand the violence 
being threatened and the accommodation being demanded, and to be confident that 
                                                 
44 Clausewitz, On War, 77. 
45 R = B × p(B) – C × p(C), defining the value of continued resistance R as equal to the product of the 
potential benefit B and the probability p(B) of attaining that benefit through resistance, less the potential 
cost C multiplied by the probability p(C) of that cost being incurred by resistance, in Robert A. Pape, 
Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 16; 
Clausewitz, On War, 77, 81. 
46 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 2. 
47 Ibid., 3. 
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cooperation is the surest way to avoid further pain.48 Even with this simple rational 
framework, Schelling made no “promise that the distinction will be made, and the 
strategies enlightened by the distinction, every time some vicious enterprise gets 
launched.”49 
3. Operational Mechanisms of Coercion 
At the end of the Cold War, even after decades of historical examples of bombing 
campaigns, it was still not clear whether coercive bombing worked, or exactly what 
qualified as a coercive campaign. Robert A. Pape identified forty bombing campaigns 
from World War I to Operation Desert Storm, defining sixteen as successful coercion, 
using four different coercive mechanisms: denial, punishment, risk, and leadership 
decapitation.50 Byman and Waxman expand on this, redefining Pape’s mechanisms into 
five: denial, weakening, unrest, power base erosion, and decapitation.51 These five 
categories effectively summarize the broadest interpretation of coercion theory today. 
4. Vocabulary of Coercion 
Is coercion war or diplomacy? It is both. Coercion requires the combination of 
threatened violence and diplomacy, even if either the threats or the demands are only 
implied. Schelling’s work on coercive diplomacy focuses on the use of threats in a 
primarily diplomatic exchange, where violence may not be used, but still is possible. 
Alternatively, many historical cases of coercion occurred during wartime, without 
explicit demands or necessarily intent, but their effects were coercive instead of 
forcible.52 Creating a dichotomy between coercive violence and other warfare is not 
practical; Clausewitz’s definition of war as a continuation of politics with the addition of 
violent means easily fits coercion as well.53 
                                                 
48 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3–4. 
49 Ibid., 5. 
50 Pape, Bombing to Win, 52, 57. 
51 Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and 
the Limits of Military Might (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 50. 
52 Pape, Bombing to Win, 12–13. 
53 Clausewitz, On War, 87. 
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Schelling draws a distinction between diplomacy and force, but as processes, not 
means. Regardless of the means, diplomacy is an interaction where “there must be some 
common interest, if only the avoidance of mutual damage,” so the use of coercive 
violence to ensure the adversary’s interest is within the realm of diplomacy.54 Force, 
however, is not concerned with the adversary’s desires, merely their capability to resist 
by force of their own. Regardless of the means used, an objective can be given in 
diplomacy, coercive or otherwise, or it can be taken by force, but not both.55 
Within the field of coercion, there are two common dichotomies. First, deterrence 
and compellance: deterrence convinces an adversary not to act, while compellance—a 
term coined by Schelling—convinces the adversary to make a positive action.56 Second, 
denial and punishment mechanisms: denial prevents the adversary from carrying out the 
act in question, while punishment exacts a price for the act being carried out but does not 
prevent it.57 However, for denial to be coercive, the coercer must impose costs on the 
enemy’s (military) capabilities for attempting the act coercion seeks to prevent, so all 
coercion imposes costs to change the enemy’s behavior. 
5. Characterizing Allied Force 
A common misconception is that because Allied Force used military force, it 
could not be diplomacy, but discrimination between force and diplomacy is made by the 
target of the campaign—ability or will—not the means used. An enemy needs both 
ability and will to attack, so forcible denial or deterrence will produce the same result on 
the defensive, but on the offensive the difference is clear: an enemy who lacks the ability 
to resist is still not necessarily compliant, whereas an enemy whose will has been broken 
can be compelled to comply. Allied Force was clearly compellance instead of forcible 
seizure, with NATO using a combination of denial and punishment mechanisms, so it is 
essential that the analytic model be coercion and not airpower. 
                                                 
54 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 1. 
55 Ibid., 1–2. 
56 Ibid., 71. 
57 These examples are in terms of deterrence; one of the weaknesses of denial as a coercive 
mechanism is that it is not easily rephrased for compellance. 
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III. RELEVANT HISTORY 
Figure 1.  Serbia and Montenegro, 2000. 
 
The United States did not officially recognize the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:  
“the U.S. view is that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), has dissolved 
and that none of the successor republics represents its continuation.” Source: “The  
World Factbook: Serbia and Montenegro,” Central Intelligence Agency, 2000, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/download/download-2000/index.html. 
The former Yugoslavia, its successor states, and their ethnic divisions are 
complicated issues at best. The intent of this chapter is to present the facts essential for 
the reader to make sense of the analysis chapters. Many sources will use Serb, Serbian, 
and Yugoslav interchangeably, but this confuses ethnic groups and nationalities: although 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was dominated by the republic of Serbia, and the 
Serb ethnic group dominated Serbia, the terms are not equivalent. For that matter, most 
state nationalities in the Balkans are also ethnic identities, so that in 1999 the majority of  
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Kosovars—residents of Kosovo—were ethnically Albanian, but Serbian citizens. This 
thesis refers to the Yugoslav government and people, only using Serb as an ethnic 
characterization and using Serbia only when that is more specific than Yugoslavia. 
A. SERBIA’S PLACE IN YUGOSLAVIA  
Serbia existed variously as a kingdom, empire, and a collection of principalities 
for centuries until being conquered by the Ottomans in the late 14th century. Serbia 
would be ruled by the Ottomans until independence in 1878, and the new Kingdom of 
Serbia would grow to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes following World War 
I. As the home of South or Yugo Slavs, this kingdom adopted the name Yugoslavia in 
1929, and after the Nazi occupation and liberation reorganized as the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), a federation of six republics: Serbia, Montenegro, 
Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.58 
The multi-national SFRY began to unravel after the death of Josip Broz Tito in 
1980, as ethnic nationalism in the constituent republics overpowered Tito’s brand of 
communism. In the 1974 constitution of the SFRY, the autonomous provinces of Kosovo 
and Vojvodina had both been elevated to a status similar to the six republics, giving the 
two provinces more weight than the Serbian republic of which they were part.59 This 
unnatural power imbalance was one of several factors which fed a rise in ethnic 
nationalism. Serbs were the largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia, but not overwhelmingly 
so: as the SFRY broke up, Serbs were a solid majority in Serbia and Montenegro, but 
only significant minorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.60 With these inherently  
 
                                                 
58 “A Guide to the United States' History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by 
Country, since 1776: Kingdom of Serbia/Yugoslavia,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, 
September 30, 2015, https://history.state.gov/countries/kingdom-of-yugoslavia.  
59 Roland Dannreuther, “War in Kosovo: History, Development and Aftermath” in Kosovo: 
Perceptions of War and Its Aftermath, ed. Mary Buckley and Sally N. Cummings (New York: 
Continuum, 2001), 16; Kosovo (capital in Pristina) is as depicted in Figure 1 and Vojvodina (capital in 
Novi Sad) is in northern Serbia. 
60 As of 1991, Serbs were 62.6% of the population in Serbia and Montenegro, 31% in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and 12.2% in Croatia; “The World Factbook: Serbia and Montenegro,” “The World 
Factbook: Bosnia and Herzegovina,” “The World Factbook: Croatia,” Central Intelligence Agency, 2000, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/download/download-2000/index.html. 
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unstable ethnic fractions, the 1986 circulation of a “blatantly nationalistic memorandum” 
by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) signaled the beginning of the end 
of the SFRY.61  
The SANU memorandum and Serbian nationalism would empower the rise of 
Slobodan Milosevic. In 1988, Milosevic saw an opportunity to seize the support of 
nationalists by endorsing the SANU memorandum, driving his election to the presidency 
of Serbia in 1989.62 As a champion of Serb nationalism, Milosevic purged the media to 
protect like-minded intellectuals, who in turn drove the nationalist movement to new 
heights of support for Milosevic.63 Milosevic consolidated power in Serbia, but in doing 
so moved Serbia further away from the other Yugoslav republics. 
In 1991 and 1992, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina all 
declared independence from the SFRY, while Serbia and Montenegro remained unified 
as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), but this new Yugoslavia was not 
universally considered a successor to the SFRY. Except for Macedonia, every declaration 
of independence was accompanied by violence, leading the period to be known as the 
Yugoslav Wars. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established in 
mid-1992, and the United States became directly involved in March 1993, enforcing a 
no-fly zone over Bosnia with Operation Deny Flight.64 Violence continued intermittently 
for the next two years until Muslim and Croat forces took the offensive in the spring of 
1995, and UNPROFOR was brushed aside by the Bosnian Serbs, who seized UN-secured 
weapons and conducted the Srebrenica massacre.65 This period of bloodshed ended after 
NATO launched a bombing campaign, Operation Deliberate Force, bringing the Serbs to 
the negotiating table and leading to the Dayton Accords and the insertion of the NATO 
                                                 
61 Slavoljub Djukic, Milosevic and Markovic: A Lust for Power, trans. Alex Dubinsky (Montreal, 
Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 16. 
62 Ibid., 27. 
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Implementation Force (IFOR) into Bosnia-Herzegovina.66 Both Deliberate Force and the 
continued involvement of NATO in the former SFRY would influence the eventual 
Allied Force. 
B. KOSOVO’S PLACE IN SERBIA  
Kosovo resonates deeply in Serbian cultural history from the Battle of Kosovo 
Polje in 1389. In Serbian lore, Lazar—most often described as a prince, but the most 
powerful of the various Serbian noblemen—was visited by an angel who offered him the 
choice of earthly victory or a martyr’s death, and “as Serbs understand this legend, 
Lazar’s choice of the ‘eternal kingdom’ secured for Serbs an eternal claim to Kosovo,” 
even as Serbia would fall to the Ottomans in the wake of the battle.67 Sabrina Ramet 
therefore dubs Kosovo “the Serbian ‘Jerusalem’”—consecrated territory beyond the 
claim of any non-Serb power.68 
Despite the Serb cultural claim to Kosovo, by the 1990s the population and 
politics was distinctly non-Serb. Tito sought to ease the nationalist tensions which 
threatened the stability of Yugoslavia, but in the case of Kosovo it meant empowering a 
province where the already-minority Serb population was declining, and would drop to 
roughly 10 percent by the mid-1980s.69 Kosovar Albanians had been agitating for greater 
independence since 1968, and one Titoist solution had been to suppress the protests of 
Kosovar Serbs and Montenegrins, yielding to the demographics of the province but 
feeding Serbian nationalist sentiment.70 
C. THE HOLBROOKE AGREEMENT TO ALLIED FORCE 
Slobodan Milosevic, originally having used Serbian nationalism and ethnic 
tensions to win election as Serbian president in 1989, was still in power in the late 1990s. 
                                                 
66 “Breakup of Yugoslavia,” U.S. Department of State. 
67 Sabrina P. Ramet, “The Kingdom of God or the Kingdom of Ends: Kosovo in Serbian 
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68 Ibid., 31. 
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The presidency of Serbia was limited to two four-year terms, so in 1997 Milosevic was 
elected President of the FRY, maintaining his power in Belgrade. The new President of 
Serbia, Milan Milutinović, was a figurehead, powerless to an extent that would gain him 
an acquittal at his war crimes trial in 2009.71 
In 1998, fighting between FRY forces and the ethnic-Albanian Kosovo Liberation 
Army led NATO to become involved in Kosovo in addition to the alliance’s role in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. This fighting caused at least 1,500 deaths and left hundreds of 
thousands homeless; in response, NATO threatened an air campaign similar to the 
previous Deliberate Force if a ceasefire was not reached.72 This ceasefire in October 
1998, the Holbrooke Agreement, allowed unarmed monitors from the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) into Kosovo, but did not change the overall 
status of the province.73 
This agreement was short-lived in its effectiveness—hostilities renewed in 
December—and damaged the credibility of NATO. Even while making the agreement, 
the Yugoslav government seemed to doubt NATO’s commitment: General Nebosja 
Pavkovic, commander of all Yugoslav troops in Kosovo, “didn’t have any valid reason to 
believe them” because “they had no reason to get involved in the internal politics of 
another country, so we couldn’t believe them.”74 The Yugoslav journalist Slavoljub 
Djukic echoed this sentiment: “The [Rambouillet] talks fell through, but many Serbs felt 
they would resume…. Milosevic, persisting in his belief that NATO was bluffing, felt 
that he could continue to play cat-and-mouse with the Americans and still reach an 
agreement.”75 
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The Rambouillet Conference had come in early 1999 after the Racak massacre 
and the expulsion of OSCE monitors. The proposed Interim Agreement for Peace and 
Self-Government in Kosovo would effectively remove Kosovo from Yugoslav control, 
requiring removal of nearly all forces and granting extraterritoriality to the NATO forces 
who would occupy the province.76 This plan was eventually accepted by Kosovar 
Albanian representatives, but rejected by the Yugoslav delegation: after the Kosovars 
signed, Milosevic was given an ultimatum to sign or be bombed.77 
Richard Holbrooke, who delivered the ultimatum to Milosevic in March 1999 and 
received his refusal in person, was convinced that Milosevic no longer thought NATO 
was bluffing about military action.78 Regardless, Milosevic could not expect to remain in 
power if he surrendered Kosovo to a foreign power without resistance and he wagered 
that NATO lacked the capability or persistence to wrest Kosovo from Yugoslav control, 
forcing NATO to make good on its threats. Airstrikes began on March 24 and continued 
until June 10, when Yugoslav forces began withdrawing to allow the entry of the NATO-
led Kosovo Force (KFOR), which remains in the province to this day.79 
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IV. OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY 
Clausewitz defined an enemy’s “power of resistance … as the product of … the 
total means at his disposal and the strength of his will.”80 Rather than ending resistance 
by using brute force to degrade the enemy’s means, coercion uses threatened punishment 
to diminish an enemy’s will. Threats only affect the enemy’s will if they are operationally 
plausible and attack objects of strategic value to the target actor, so while the execution of 
threat mechanisms is an operational matter, the selection of a course of action requires 
knowledge of the enemy’s strategic values and is therefore a strategic choice. This 
chapter will analyze the mechanisms defined by Byman and Waxman—denial, 
weakening, unrest, power base erosion, and decapitation—based on how their effects 
occurred in Operation Allied Force.81 
A. DENIAL 
As Byman and Waxman explain it, “denial works when adversary leaders 
recognize that they cannot gain benefits and will continue to pay costs if they do not 
concede.”82 The initial plan for Allied Force called for attacking Yugoslav forces to 
prevent their goal of ethnically cleansing Kosovo, and destroying them if the government 
of Slobodan Milosevic did not concede.83 Coercive denial is most effective as a defensive 
strategy, so it was a poor choice for Allied Force, but it may have been selected for its 
similarity with conventional land warfare doctrine. NATO did inflict costs on the 
Yugoslav forces, but they were not unacceptable, and NATO never prevented the 
Yugoslav military from occupying Kosovo or attacking Kosovar Albanians. 
1. Preventing Yugoslav Goals  
NATO’s airstrikes into Kosovo focused on targeting heavy equipment, dooming 
the effort from the beginning because destroying tanks and artillery did not prevent 
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Yugoslav forces from occupying Kosovo, brutalizing Kosovar Albanians, or holding off 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Even if all their tanks, personnel carriers, and 
artillery had been destroyed, soldiers would still have capabilities similar to the Ministry 
of the Interior (MUP) police and the Serb irregular groups in Kosovo. To dislodge the 
infantry who were actually occupying Kosovo would have required a ground invasion by 
NATO, which did not occur, or airstrikes to inflict tens of thousands of casualties on the 
occupiers, which also did not happen. 
The OSCE’s Kosovo Verification Mission, compiling 2,764 refugee interviews 
and other reporting, found that the vast majority of human rights violations and massacres 
were conducted without reliance on heavy weapons.84 Over the course of the conflict, 
over 860,000 Kosovar Albanians became refugees—over half the Kosovar Albanian 
population—and the refugee flow did not appreciably slow until mid-May, when the 
bombing had already been underway for six weeks.85 Although NATO had “forced the 
Serb military and police heavy equipment into hiding,” most evidence contradicts the 
associated claim that “these forces were unable to conduct their planned, unrestricted 
operations against the Albanian populace in Kosovo or against the KLA.”86 
An additional argument, that NATO’s airpower could turn the tide of ground 
combat in favor of the KLA, was proven false by the failure of Operation Arrow. This 
offensive, launched in late May by 4,000 KLA guerrillas, made little progress in opening 
a corridor from Albania to the interior of Kosovo.87 Although a NATO spokesperson 
claimed the guerrilla activity created a “target-rich environment” of responding Yugoslav 
forces, bombing did not help the KLA capture much ground.88 NATO officials asserted 
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that intelligence from KLA scouts on the ground increased the targeting effectiveness, 
but they also admitted that “what really counted” was the bombing of targets inside 
Serbia, rather than attacking the forces in Kosovo.89 
2. Inflicting Costs 
After the attempt to deny Yugoslav forces their goals in Kosovo, the remainder of 
the denial effort was a punishment campaign against those forces. All coercion requires 
inflicting costly damage on the enemy, though the punishment in denial is unique in 
targeting the enemy military, rather than the civilian government or economy. For the 
punishment campaign, typical measures of performance like speed of advance, territory 
held, and remaining useful (friendly) forces were not applicable, so analysts recorded 
damage to Yugoslav units. The most identifiable elements of a military unit is its heavy 
equipment, so vehicles and artillery pieces were used as a surrogate for the overall 
strength of units. Counting destroyed vehicles is appropriate to assess the specific task of 
finding and destroying enemy vehicles, but expanding it to a measure of overall 
effectiveness increases the reliance on assumptions and wishful thinking—similar to the 
body counts in Vietnam.  
Estimates of Yugoslav heavy equipment in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 are 
incomplete and require interpolation, and assessments of NATO’s strike effectiveness are 
all based on considerable assumptions and guesswork. A common starting point is the 
self-reporting of the Yugoslav government; the declared strength of the 52nd Corps, the 
primary maneuver element of the 3rd Army in Kosovo, was 375 armored vehicles, 
358 artillery pieces, and 9,068 troops.90 Those numbers would put approximately one-
fifth of Yugoslav armor and between 10 and 30 percent of Yugoslav artillery in 
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Kosovo.91 The OSCE estimated that there were 15,000–20,000 regular Yugoslav soldiers 
in Kosovo by April 1999, territorial reservists mobilized from Kosovo and surrounding 
areas, and nearly 30,000 police and Serb paramilitaries.92 By comparison, the active duty 
strength of the Yugoslav Forces was between 85,000 and 114,000.93 
How much the NATO bombardment affected these forces in Kosovo is heavily 
debated. The report of the Kosovo Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team, presented on 
September 16, 1999, by General Wesley Clark and Brigadier General John Corley, U.S. 
Air Force, is the most optimistic assessment of effectiveness against heavy equipment. 
NATO’s postwar estimate of Yugoslav equipment deployed to Kosovo was roughly 
800 armored vehicles and 750 artillery pieces—twice the prewar declaration—of which 
NATO was confident of striking nearly 250 armored vehicles and nearly 400 artillery 
pieces.94 
NATO defined a “successful ‘strike’” to mean that “the weapon impacted a valid 
target,” but not necessarily that the target was destroyed.95 Only 44 armored vehicles and 
20 artillery pieces were confirmed as catastrophic kills by finding substantial wreckage in 
postwar investigation.96 Had strikes been causing serious damage, hulks of destroyed 
vehicles should have been in much greater evidence, because disabled armored vehicles 
are heavy and typically require specialized recovery vehicles to salvage.97 These 
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inconsistencies cast significant doubt on the assessed effectiveness of NATO’s airstrikes, 
and even by NATO’s generous assessment, less than half the targets identified and 
attacked were hits.98 
More pessimistic assessments of the bombing’s effectiveness tend to use 
Yugoslav government sources, which display their own inconsistencies. Yugoslavia’s 
Annual Data Exchanges for the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control claim that 
during 1999 only 30 armored vehicles and 35 artillery pieces were lost, and the number 
of mortars increased.99 In addition to admitting to only 9 tanks destroyed, while NATO 
found wreckage from 26 tanks, the declarations omit two vehicle types—the BTR-50 
personnel carrier and M36 self-propelled gun—though NATO presented clear 
photographic evidence of both in Kosovo.100 Furthermore, the January 1, 1999 
declaration claims a total of 1,025 tanks, the exact number allowed to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia under the Agreement, and the only tank losses admitted were of 
the newest model, suggesting that a number of older tanks had been retained in an 
undeclared status and were returned to declared service to replace losses.101 Using either 
set of estimates, there are serious inconsistencies in NATO’s claimed effectiveness, and 
there are no rigorous estimates of soldiers, police, or paramilitary personnel killed, 
wounded, or otherwise removed from the battlefield. 
3. Coercive Effectiveness 
For denial to occur operationally, Yugoslav forces had to be unable to retain the 
benefit (Kosovo) and attempting to do so had to be costly. For denial to be strategically 
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relevant, the target of coercion (Slobodan Milosevic) had to find those costs to the 
Yugoslav forces unacceptable and determine that concession was preferable to further 
suffering. Therefore, the coercive value of a denial strategy was dependent on Milosevic 
valuing the Yugoslav military. 
From the limited evidence available, it is unclear whether Milosevic had any 
special feelings for Yugoslav soldiers or whether he was willing to sacrifice them to 
maintain control of Kosovo. General Clark had “seen first-hand Milosevic’s keen interest 
in and knowledge of military matters,” as a Milosevic was “a well-trained and educated 
reserve officer.”102 From that, Clark concluded that Milosevic “couldn’t stand to have 
these forces seriously hurt.”103 Contrastingly, Slavoljub Djukic recounted that in the 
army, Milosevic’s “academic marks were high, but his physical condition and military 
preparedness were debatable…. His former classmates maintain that he never ran and 
never lifted anything heavier than a spoon.”104 Even if Milosevic was emotionally 
invested in the military, Kosovo was Serbian soil, so it seems unlikely that military 
casualties would easily influence his decision-making. 
4. Strengths and Weaknesses 
Denial was an ineffective mechanism of coercion in Allied Force because both 
operational requirements—inflicting costs and denying the benefit—could not be met by 
NATO, and it does not appear that Slobodan Milosevic was especially vulnerable to 
coercion by denial. In 1999, the NATO air forces committed were an order of magnitude 
larger and a generation more advanced than anything the Yugoslav air force had.105 
Resisting and complicating the NATO air campaign were fixed air defenses, mobile air 
defenses, passive protection measures, and environmental factors, and NATO was only 
able to partially mitigate these issues. Yugoslavia’s air force, despite some modern 
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equipment, was hopelessly outmatched by NATO’s fighters. NATO fighters shot down 
six Yugoslav jets, and destroyed one hundred on the ground, effectively eliminating the 
Yugoslav air force within days.106 Fixed surface to air missile (SAM) sites were heavily 
hit and mobile SAM systems prioritized survival over lethality, so Yugoslav gunners only 
managed to down two allied warplanes during the entire conflict.107  
Despite the lack of significant casualties, NATO aviators were still hampered by 
surviving air defenses, passive Yugoslav defenses, the environment, and NATO rules. 
The threat of mobile SAMs forced NATO crews to carefully plan flight paths, remain at 
high altitudes, and fly suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions for the entirety 
of the conflict, reducing efficiency. The U.S. Department of Defense’s After-Action 
Report also admits that “reliance on camouflage and concealment protected much of the 
Serbian force” and that cloud cover impeded air strikes on 54 of 78 days in the 
campaign.108 Yugoslav forces also exploited NATO’s restrictive rules of engagement by 
locating equipment in civilian areas. Later in the campaign, when KLA forces had begun 
passing precise intelligence to NATO forces, Yugoslav targets could still move in the 
time NATO’s air tasking cycle took to plan and execute a strike mission.109 These 
defensive measures did not destroy NATO warplanes, but played a large part in reducing 
NATO’s effectiveness against Yugoslav forces in Kosovo. 
This limited efficiency made it difficult for NATO to inflict unacceptable costs, 
and it made it impossible for NATO to deny Milosevic control over Kosovo. Denial is 
most effective as deterrence, because a defender will already possess the objective being 
denied and only needs to hold it. Holding ground against the enemy is a classic function 
of armies, so it is possible that denial was chosen as a mechanism because the 
commanding general, Wesley Clark, was defaulting to his Army background. However, 
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NATO could not effectively deny Yugoslavia control of Kosovo unless a ground invasion 
seized and held the province, and such a ground force was far more than NATO political 
leaders could approve. Because denial was neither effective at denying the objective nor 
efficient at punishing the enemy, it was not coercively effective in Kosovo. 
B. WEAKENING 
Weakening “targets the entire country with the threat of pain,” in the knowledge 
that some pain will be directly felt by the targets of coercion.110 It is most efficiently 
manifested in targeting industrial networks and government power structures, a strategy 
extremely similar to traditional U.S. Air Force strategic bombing doctrine. This 
similarity, and the exceptional proficiency at executing that doctrine, explains how 
weakening was so effective in Allied Force. 
1. Weakening the Yugoslav Economy 
The collapse of the SFRY had left the successor republics in dire economic straits. 
The Soviet-era economy of the federation had relied on centralized industries and 
interdependence between the constituent republics, leaving the remaining economies 
weak and inflexible, and potentially vulnerable to coercive pressure. The start of the 
Yugoslav Wars in 1991 seriously hurt the Serbian and Montenegrin economies, with 
output halving by 1993, and the situation was worsened by U.N. sanctions.111 The FRY 
was in serious economic trouble by the late 1990s, with unemployment estimated over 
35 percent in 1995 and existing manufacturing jobs concentrated in heavy industry.112 
The economy was also intentionally mismanaged, as Maja Miljkovic and Marko Attila 
Hoare explain: Milosevic “stimulated corruption and criminal activities linked to the 
informal and black market economy, meanwhile those strong and viable firms that did 
exist but whose managements were politically opposed to the regime were destroyed or 
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taken over, regardless of the economic cost.”113 Even after sanctions were lifted in 
December 1995, corruption and the lack of cooperation on human rights and war crimes 
issues limited outside investment, leaving the economy stagnant into the late 1990s.114 
Allied Force began with the destruction of air defense targets, but after that target 
list was exhausted, NATO began striking dual-use targets. Those hit were significant: 
thirty-five major bridges, over half Yugoslavia’s petroleum reserves, and all the nation’s 
oil refineries.115 The air campaign damaged or destroyed “40 percent of capacity to repair 
armored vehicles, half of capacity to produce explosives, 65 percent of capacity to 
produce ammunition, and 20 percent of capacity to assemble and repair aircraft.”116 
Ammunition production and vehicle repair would have been essential to a ground war, 
but the ability to repair aircraft would have been of limited use with the Yugoslav air 
force wiped out early in the bombing campaign. 
Because the Yugoslav economy was poorly diversified from heavy industry, the 
damage caused by even a military-focused bombing campaign was incredible. Djukic 
cites estimates of $85–215 billion in damage; in comparison, the Yugoslav GDP was 
estimated at $24.3 billion before the conflict.117 NATO cut power to 70 percent of the 
nation in the first attack on the electrical grid, at first using specialized bombs to limit the 
duration of the outages, but later attacks used conventional bombs and caused long-term 
damage.118 Such destruction was relatively simple for NATO to execute, so the bombing 
campaign would continue to traumatize Yugoslavia as long as NATO had targets. 
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Only leaders absolutely unconcerned with the welfare of their nations cannot be 
coerced by weakening. It is unclear how directly weakening drove the coercion, but it did 
present the strongest ultimatum: if Yugoslavia did not surrender Kosovo, NATO was 
threatening to destroy Yugoslavia as a functioning nation. If Milosevic valued anything 
beyond his own power and survival, NATO’s weakening strategy clearly threatened it. If 
anything, weakening was less effective because the Yugoslav economy was so weak to 
begin with; more than a few bombs were dropped on already-idle factories.119 
3. Strengths and Weaknesses
The Air Component Commander for Operation Allied Force, General Michael 
Short, seems to have been attempting to fight a conventional war against the industrial 
base and government facilities of Yugoslavia, rather than attempting coercion at all: in 
February 2000 he insisted that when politicians ask “military force to solve a problem 
that politicians could not, then they need to grit their teeth and stay with us.”120 This and 
other statements indicate that Short had not been using force to enable a political 
solution, but had been trying to fight a conventional war. Short correctly identified major 
failings of the campaign, seeing the “random bombing of military targets” as wasted 
effort and that the “targeting philosophy clearly has to be agreed upon before we start,” 
but this only reinforces how much overlap existed between the operational bombing 
doctrine that Short was using and the strategic use of weakening.121 
Despite a deficit in strategic planning, the U.S. Air Force exceled at the 
operational task of precision bombing, and was able to credibly threaten virtually any 
fixed target in Yugoslavia. Regardless of which targets were most valued by Slobodan 
Milosevic, NATO’s effectiveness in hitting fixed targets guaranteed that Yugoslav 
resistance would be costly in general: the very definition of weakening. Even though 
119 William M. Arkin, “Smart Bombs, Dumb Targeting?” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 56, No. 
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weakening was not an explicitly planned mechanism, it was the best executed and 
appears to have put the most pressure on the Milosevic regime. 
C. UNREST 
Denial and weakening both threaten material assets of a nation, but the other 
mechanisms—unrest, power base erosion, and decapitation—pressure enemy leaders 
personally by threatening their office, power, and survival. The largest-scale mechanism, 
unrest, requires a coercer capable of affecting popular sentiment to threaten the target 
leader’s domestic political support, but it is only effective if that support is valued—non-
democratic nations would logically be less vulnerable to unrest than democracies. Also, 
changing popular sentiment in a foreign country is very difficult, so unrest is easiest in 
nations where the population is already indifferent or opposed to government policies. 
NATO’s advantages and Yugoslavia’s vulnerabilities were not aligned to favor unrest as 
a strategy in Allied Force. 
1. Fomenting Unrest
Initially, Yugoslavs rallied behind the government when the bombing began, 
giving Milosevic a temporary boost in support. Djukic, far from a Milosevic loyalist, 
describes how “NATO’s raids served to redirect their mounting intolerance of the regime 
toward America, Great Britain, and France, traditional allies from whom democrats in 
Serbia expected assistance, not bombardment.”122 Furthermore, the state of emergency 
allowed Milosevic to clamp down on the press even more than he had previously done. 
Government propaganda was pervasive to the point that no press was fully trusted: even 
in Belgrade, where satellite dishes and Internet connections made Western news readily 
available, residents put little stock in either Yugoslav or Western media, but in a wartime 
atmosphere, the first instinct of Yugoslavs was to support their government.123  
As the conflict dragged on, no propaganda could conceal the effects of NATO 
bombing. The precision munitions employed by NATO caused relatively few 
122 Djukic, Milosevic and Markovic, 133. 
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casualties—roughly 500 civilians and perhaps a thousand soldiers were killed throughout 
the entire campaign—but destruction of infrastructure like bridges and the electrical grid 
could not be hidden from citizens.124 While Belgrade itself was relatively lightly hit, Novi 
Sad, the provincial capital of Vojvodina and second largest city in Serbia, lost all three of 
its bridges over the Danube in the first month of bombing.125 On May 2, in the air 
campaign’s sixth week, the first attacks were carried out on the electrical grid, blacking 
out 70 percent of the country.126 NATO “regret[ed] the inconvenience that power outages 
have caused to the Serb people,” but insisted they would continue until Milosevic met 
their demands.127 
2. Coercive Value of Unrest 
Even as the destruction became impossible to ignore, it did not lead to political 
upheaval in Serbia. As Mila Radavanovic-Zecevic, a resident of the hard-hit Novi Sad, 
said: “Do you think when we are in a war and have bombs falling, that we can think 
about politics?”128 Sabrina Ramet notes anti-war protesters in late May, but numbering in 
the hundreds, they were not a serious threat to the Milosevic regime.129 Even NATO 
briefers understood that pummeling an already-struggling population would not prompt 
political change: “We don’t want the population to get the message, [we] think they got 
the message years ago when their standards of living started plummeting as a result of the 
misrule of the current government. No, we want the regime to get the message.”130  
Even as attitudes began to change, airstrikes did not rapidly create the widespread 
anger that unrest requires. It took weeks before the pro-regime rallies and concerts ended, 
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and when dissent appeared it mostly took the form of antiwar rallies and draft-dodging 
instead of direct advocacy for regime change.131 One explanation for this failure to 
mobilize against the government was the state’s control of the media, presenting an 
unopposed government narrative of the conflict. While this propaganda did not 
necessarily convince many, it confused and divided the potential anti-regime groups, and 
poisoned the credibility of all media reporting, so there was nothing to unify around.132 
Allied Force left most Yugoslavs suffering and unhappy with their situation, but 
did not result in significant political change. When Milosevic did stand for reelection in 
late 2000, he was ousted by a candidate who shared many of his nationalist positions. 
That successor, Vojislav Kostunica, appears to share Milosevic’s demagoguery 
concerning Kosovo’s eternally Serbian nature, but because he was not the leader to lose 
Kosovo, he is not willing to fight NATO for it.133 To replace the leader without 
significant change in policy might have been justification for a coup, but it was not a 
compelling reason for a mass uprising to develop, so unrest was never an effective 
mechanism of applying coercive pressure to Milosevic.  
3. Strengths and Weaknesses  
Although Yugoslavia was putatively democratic, it was a poor candidate for 
fomenting unrest. The Serbian nationalism that drove the Yugoslav policy in Kosovo was 
popular among the Serbian majority of Yugoslavs, leaving no internal divisions to 
exploit. NATO’s only means of changing sentiment would be inflicting mass suffering, 
but by 1999 there were few opportunities to inflict noticeable suffering: Yugoslavia had 
already experienced years of warfare, over one-third of workers were unemployed, and 
the respective Serbian and Montenegrin economies were still struggling from the wars in 
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the early 1990s.134 NATO bombs could still deny basic services to the Yugoslav 
population, but doing so created destitution which precluded political mobilization.135 
One thing that NATO did do was to literally bring the war home—the earlier wars had 
been fought outside of Serbia, mostly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but NATO struck in the 
hearts of major Serbian cities and hit widely-used infrastructure like transportation and 
the electrical grid. 
To foment unrest requires far more than simply applying force; it also requires an 
effective campaign of political messaging. The panic that Douhet predicted bomber raids 
would cause has never been borne out by history; a better model is the political 
campaigning of insurgents, which has been successful in history. In insurgency warfare, 
the operational objective is legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the people, 
therefore a power—either insurgents or an outside actor—must degrade the legitimacy of 
the target state’s government in order to move the population towards unrest.136 The 
population of Yugoslavia had been so inured to propaganda that political messaging was 
ineffective and thus unrest never developed, despite the suffering that NATO bombs were 
causing. 
D. POWER BASE EROSION 
Where unrest tries to change the minds of the massed populace, power base 
erosion targets a narrower group of key supporters with more focused force. It requires 
detailed knowledge of the nation’s power structure to threaten the right supporters and 
precision military capabilities to make those threats specific, but the value of insider 
support is more universal than popular support—no leader can rule without a trusted 
inner circle. 
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1. Crony Attack 
Slobodan Milosevic’s hold on Yugoslavia appeared vulnerable to supporter 
targeting or crony attack, but it took a relatively long time for any plan along those lines 
to form. Large portions of the economy had been subordinated to the political purposes of 
the Milosevic government and this patronage was heavily reflected in the ownership of 
dual-use targets. Virtually every major industrial target was owned or operated by a 
political ally: the Sloboda factory in Cacak (ammunition), the Zastava plant in 
Kragujevac (armored vehicle repair), Jugopetrol and Technogas (petroleum) were all 
controlled by leaders of Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) or his wife Mirjana 
Markovic’s Yugoslav United Left (YUL) parties—the petroleum companies being 
controlled respectively by the speaker of the Serbian parliament, Dragan Tomic, and by 
the Serbian prime minister, Mirko Majanovic.137 The media and its propaganda usage 
was also dominated by party loyalists: one office complex housed four media outlets and 
the headquarters for both the SPS and YUL.138 Eventually, NATO planners came up with 
the “3M” targeting plan, targeting the Milosevic regime’s “money, MUP (Ministry of 
Interior), and media.”139 Unfortunately, it did not dominate targeting and “on the ground 
the message could hardly be extracted from the background noise.”140 
2. Strengths and Weaknesses 
Yugoslavia was a good candidate for power base erosion, but efficient execution 
would have required significant prior planning and detailed analysis of the governmental 
power structure. Operationally, power base erosion used many of the same methods  
as weakening—a strength of the U.S. Air Force—simply focused on a more discrete 
group of targets. The prolonged bombing hurt everyone in Yugoslavia, but because the 
plans to target Milosevic’s power base were formed late in the air campaign and were 
never the primary focus of bombing efforts, Milosevic’s power base did not suffer 
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disproportionately, nor was their evidence of those supporters putting substantial pressure 
on Milosevic to accommodate NATO’s demands.141 
Power base erosion, like unrest, requires a messaging campaign to be successful. 
For this message to be acted upon, it must be discernable and supported by a pattern of 
physical effects. A clear enough pattern of effects could both convey and support a 
simple message without accompanying words. In Allied Force, however, Milosevic 
supporters never got a clear message and even if they had, NATO’s attacks did not 
establish a strong pattern to support it. 
E. DECAPITATION 
Even more specific than power base erosion, decapitation is a threat directly 
against the target leader. It is the most powerful threat possible against a target leader, but 
also the most difficult to credibly make, because it requires the capability to kill or 
capture an enemy leader, on short notice and without the element of surprise. 
Decapitation of political leaders is not a usual American or NATO strategy, and there 
was no indicated plan to threaten or attempt decapitation during Allied Force. 
1. Decapitation Effects in Allied Force 
NATO bombs did kill General Ljubisa Velickovic, the deputy commander of the 
Yugoslav Air Force, but he was the only senior leader to become a casualty during Allied 
Force, and appears to have been hit unintentionally.142 Milosevic’s official residence in 
Belgrade was hit on April 22, and the presidential villa in Dobanovci was hit multiple 
times in May, but NATO insisted these attacks were against the command and control 
facilities at those locations.143 While these attacks may have been interpreted as 
attempted assassinations, Milosevic had options to mitigate the threat and this danger 
does not appear to have produced leverage. 
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2. Strengths and Weaknesses 
Even if decapitation is ineffective as a coercive mechanism, replacement of a 
target state’s leadership can aid the negotiation process, because new leaders may have 
the personal freedom to make concessions their predecessors could not. Byman and 
Waxman refer to the “audience costs” in domestic politics as leaders try to be “viewed as 
strong and as resistant of foreign pressure.”144 These domestic concerns can drive leaders 
to make hardline statements and take uncompromising positions that are difficult to 
retreat from, but new leadership may not be as trapped. 
F. EFFICIENT MECHANISMS IN ALLIED FORCE 
Application of sufficient violence will eventually result in some effect, but the 
intent of this chapter was to determine which mechanisms were most efficient in Allied 
Force at converting military action to operational effects and then converting those 
effects to coercive pressure on Slobodan Milosevic. Denial was a clear failure, weakening 
was clearly effective, and the remaining mechanisms are difficult to precisely assess 
without more evidence. The largest determinant of effectiveness was the mechanism’s fit 
with NATO’s capabilities at the time: destroying an army from the air was difficult for 
even the most capable air force, making denial impossible without ground forces, but 
NATO, and particularly the United States, was superlatively capable at bombing 
industrial and infrastructure targets, making weakening easy to execute, even if it was not 
explicitly planned. This suggests that the utility of each coercive mechanism is heavily 
dependent on the capabilities of the coercer and the conditions of the target state, and to a 
far lesser degree dependent on the coercer’s intent in execution. 
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V. THEORY OF STRATEGIC VICTORY 
Operational success is irrelevant if it does not serve a strategic goal, so every 
military campaign needs a theory of victory: an explanation of how it will contribute to 
strategic success and thereby support national policy. Coercive campaigns carry 
additional stipulations because they require the grudging cooperation of the enemy; 
requiring that a theory of coercive victory not only explain the conduct of war, but 
also explain the strategic goals of war termination. In addition to the coercer having a 
viable theory of victory, the target must find the planed threats credible, understand what 
is demanded of them, and accept that trade. The target government cannot have its 
own theory of victory, or it will likely pursue that avenue until forcibly blocked. This 
chapter addresses how these five principles were, or were not, addressed during 
Operation Allied Force. 
A. HAVE A PLAN 
In his autobiography, General Wesley Clark quoted Clausewitz: “No one in his 
right mind would, or ought to, begin a war if he didn’t know how to finish it.”145 Without 
a theory of victory, a strategist will have no way to predict whether a given operational 
action will help, hinder, or be irrelevant to the goals of the conflict. Coercion may 
succeed without an explicit plan, threats, demands, or even intent by the coercer—many 
historical case studies are of this unexpected sort—but luck is not a strategy.146 
Unfortunately, Allied Force was not planned in great depth, beginning with the 
target list. Clark describes how Allied Force began with only “one hundred or so [targets] 
currently ready to go,” a list that would be exhausted within days.147 To add targets 
required analysis of military value, likely Yugoslav military casualties, risks from a near-
miss, and collateral damage estimates for each possible weapon, all before a target faced 
145 Clark, Waging Modern War, 179; Clausewitz, On War, 579. 
146 Both Pape’s Bombing to Win and Byman and Waxman’s Dynamics of Coercion analyze a number 
of historical cases before the modern theory of coercion was developed in the 1960s. 
147 Clark, Waging Modern War, 198. 
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further review in Washington, DC, “and finally ended up on President Clinton’s desk for 
his approval.”148 As a result, approving targets became the bottleneck in the system and 
some targets were struck simply because they passed legal approval, not because they 
were of great value to the coercive campaign.149 Logically, it was still better to drop 
bombs without a plan than to pause and publicly confirm that lack of a plan, but not much 
better. 
In addition to a lack of planning before the conflict began, there was a lack of 
information on which to base the planning that was done. Based on the desert combat 
experience of the Persian Gulf War, Clark’s staff “used the best planning system that we 
had in the Air Force, but it didn’t do well with bad weather;” a substantial issue when 
weather would impede airstrikes for two-thirds of the campaign.150 That such a fact could 
surprise NATO—which had conducted Operation Deliberate Force in neighboring 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995—is troubling. 
More troubling than the weak operational planning, on March 28—four days into 
the operation—Clark found himself asking NATO Secretary General Javier Solana what 
the political objectives for the campaign were.151 In addition to Clark not knowing the 
political objectives his military strategy should support, there were also significant 
differences among the NATO nations.152 Holding the alliance together would be a major 
achievement, but one that should have been accomplished before the airstrikes began, and 
the weakness of NATO’s planning hamstrung every following effort in the campaign. 
B. MAKE CREDIBLE THREATS 
Coercion is based on threats, so the credibility of those threats is of paramount 
importance. All coercive mechanisms work by threatening a higher cost than the target 
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can bear, and since military force is ultimately finite, high credibility is essential to 
threatening a high expected cost. To make a threat credible, coercers must establish their 
willingness to use particular levels of force, and they must establish that the threat being 
made is within that range of credibility. In some scenarios, particularly in cases of 
compellance, the threat must be repeatable until compliance is achieved.153 If a coercer 
cannot convince the target that a given threat is plausible and credible, carrying out the 
threat will help make next iteration of threats more credible. 
Slobodan Milosevic left no writings or records of his decision-making during 
Allied Force, but he suggested to Richard Holbrooke that he believed some use of force 
would occur. Holbrooke delivered the last ultimatum in March 1999: “He knew the 
bombing would start immediately after our departure,” and Milosevic confirmed that 
“‘Yes. You’ll bomb us.’”154 Despite believing that force would be used, it seems that 
Yugoslav leadership doubted that it would truly be “swift, severe and sustained”—
Holbrooke’s carefully chosen words.155 According to Nebosja Pavkovic, commander of 
Yugoslav forces in Kosovo: “We used to study their possible strategy, etc. We knew that 
they wanted to scare us into surrender,” but “I didn’t think that it would last for 78 
days.”156 Military leadership did not ignore the threats—command centers and other 
predictable targets were abandoned when NATO bombs hit them—but it does not seem 
that anyone believed NATO’s campaign would continue indefinitely. 
Increasing the magnitude of the threatened air campaign was not realistic, and the 
only effective way to increase the credibility of the threat was to begin carrying it out, so 
some measure of violence was probably inevitable in the spring of 1999. NATO’s 
demonstrated willingness to continue and escalate the air campaign gave increased 
credence to the threat of continued escalation. NATO’s credibility was further reinforced 
by the alliance’s unwavering persistence in the face of collateral damage incidents, the 
                                                 
153 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 70. 
154 Richard Holbrooke, interview transcript. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Nebojsa Pavkovic, interview transcript. 
 44
most diplomatically significant of which was the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in 
Belgrade.  
While bombing their embassy seriously damaged relations with the Chinese, a 
side effect was convincing Yugoslavs of NATO’s strength and seriousness. One 
Belgrader wondered “how can such a small power do anything, when the U.S. can do this 
to China?” and believed that NATO was willing to bomb as long as necessary.157 The 
way NATO made no public shifts after noteworthy instances of collateral damage—and 
definitely gave no sign of a pause in the bombing—made it clear that nothing short of 
Milosevic’s concession to NATO’s demands would end the bombing. 
The trouble with credibility is that is costs the coercer. Not every bluff will be 
successful, so establishing credibility will undoubtedly require some otherwise avoidable 
violence, with the associated costs of using force. Ironically, NATO’s lack of combat 
losses reduced the credibility of their commitment, while the shoot-down of Yugoslav 
MiG-29s on the first night of airstrikes emphasized that the Yugoslavs were willing to die 
to hold Kosovo.158 Establishing NATO’s credibility to threaten a 79th day of bombing 
took the alliance 78 days of bombing, at the cost of billions of dollars.159 
C. COMMUNICATE DEMANDS AND THREATS 
In the violent diplomacy of coercion, communication retains the same essential 
position it holds in other forms of diplomacy. Demands must be communicated with 
enough specificity and clarity that the target can understand them, otherwise compliance 
will be a matter of chance and guesswork, rather than cooperation or negotiation. Threats 
should also be communicated in specific terms, but vagueness in threats carries less of a 
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penalty: vague demands can lead to disagreements over compliance and perceptions of 
bad faith, while vague threats are merely inefficient. In Allied Force, NATO was very 
specific and clear in their demands, but made threats so vaguely that an outside observer 
might not know if they were intentional. 
1. In Words 
NATO specified five demands of the Milosevic government: 
[1] Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending 
of violence and repression; 
[2] ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and 
paramilitary forces; 
[3] agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence; 
[4] agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced 
persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations; 
[5] provide credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of 
the Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a political framework 
agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the 
Charter of the United Nations.
160
 
These demands were reiterated daily by NATO spokesman Jamie Shea during his 
morning briefing to the press.161 By voicing their demands constantly and publicly, there 
was no way NATO leaders or diplomats could be confused, and there was no reason 
these demands should be mistaken as ambiguous or flexible by the Yugoslav 
government. NATO’s demands had been delivered in private prior to the air campaign; if 
they had remained private, Milosevic could have attempted to negotiate them down to 
less stringent and less specific conditions, but making them public limited the alliance’s 
flexibility, making the demands more credible as well as unambiguous. 
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Of NATO’s five demands, only the first and last have any vagueness, but 
removing Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and allowing international military forces in 
would guarantee the others by removing the physical ability by Yugoslavia to conduct 
further violence, obstruct humanitarian efforts, or interfere with Kosovo’s political 
process. Because the handover of control in Kosovo was the underpinning condition of 
compliance, NATO made sure that it was unambiguous. Milosevic had indicated a 
willingness to accede to NATO’s demands on June 3, but NATO kept the pressure on—
not suspending combat operations for nearly a week—until the details of the Military 
Technical Agreement had been finalized for the Yugoslav withdrawal to be “rapid … 
total and … effectively verifiable.”162 
Against these very specific demands, NATO was making very non-specific 
threats. The ultimatum delivered by Richard Holbrooke on the eve of the bombing 
campaign had threatened “swift, severe and sustained” attacks, but these terms did not 
appear to be specific enough for Milosevic to understand.163 Milosevic did understand 
that NATO would bomb Yugoslavia, but there is no evidence either he, or Holbrooke, 
knew the scope of the attacks which would ultimately take place. 
2. In Actions 
The other way to issue threats was “communication by detonation,” as William 
M. Arkin described it, who also noted that NATO’s strikes followed a pattern more 
clearly defined by legal and political restraints than a positive plan.164 This apparent lack 
of a targeting plan was accurate: the target list when the bombing began was roughly one 
hundred targets, all in the Yugoslav air defense network.165 Without specific coercive 
threats established beforehand, non-specific violence drowned out words once the 
bombing began. 
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Violence is inherently a less precise medium than words, but destruction carries 
far more weight than denunciation, so precise military force is essential to effective 
coercive messaging. Allied Force and the 1995 campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Deliberate Force, both had high use of precision munitions: the earlier operation actually 
used a higher percentage (69 percent to Allied Force’s 35 percent).166 Allied Force also 
saw the combat debut of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), the first all-weather 
guided bomb, as laser- and electro-optically guided weapons required visibility over the 
target, but JDAMs guided by Global Positioning System (GPS) signals in all weather and 
lighting conditions.167 These new weapons gave NATO an unprecedented ability to hit 
targets precisely; a necessity for specific messages to be discernable from bombing. 
Even as NATO demonstrated great precision in bombing, many confused this 
with intent in targeting, making mistakes hard to dismiss. On the night of May 7, NATO 
aircraft attacked a building in Belgrade believed to be the Federal Directorate for Supply 
and Procurement and precisely hit all aimpoints—perfect precision—but the mission had 
been planned based on inaccurate information: the building was the Chinese Embassy.168 
Chinese sources “claimed that the embassy bombing could not have been accidental 
because the vast array of American intelligence means focused on Yugoslavia precluded 
such a mistake,” forgetting that even the NATO intelligence services had weaknesses, 
and ground-level intelligence in Belgrade was one of them.169 At this point, the precision 
of the attack worked against NATO’s message: the fact that the bombs had only 
destroyed part of the building, even being fused to detonate on a specific floor, was seen 
as proof that the attack had been precisely planned against the embassy, irrespective of 
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the number of Yugoslav targets hit in the same precise fashion.170 Intelligence can never 
be overvalued in coercion, because precision strikes inherently appear intentional and 
meaningful, so unintended consequences carry as much weight as intended ones.  
NATO’s threats were never specific, summing to the general message that bombs 
would continue to destroy important infrastructure indefinitely, but the operational 
efficiency of strikes on infrastructure gave this threat enough magnitude to compensate 
for its vagueness. Even with this undeniable threat, the clarity of NATO’s demands was 
essential to the success of coercion. Uncertainty in one could be compensated for, but had 
both threats and demands been unclear, negotiations would have been very difficult. 
D. MAKE THE TRADE ACCEPTABLE 
Even if the target of coercion finds the coercer’s threats credible, and understands 
the demands being made of them, concession still will not occur until it is the most 
acceptable option available to the target. This does not mean the coercer’s demands must 
match an objective standard of moderation: in World War II, the United States obtained 
nearly-unconditional surrender from Japan by credibly threatening the lives of millions, 
and Pape (writing prior to Allied Force) called Japan’s surrender “the most successful 
case of modern military coercion.”171 Regardless of the scale of the threats and demands 
being made, coercion works best when the demands are less onerous than the threats, but 
not by too much. 
In the case of Kosovo, the Rambouillet Accords demanded too great a concession 
for relief from NATO’s initial threats to be an acceptable exchange, requiring a painful 
bombing campaign before the threats increased to outweigh the demands. NATO 
leadership was not willing to modify the demands, but failed to understand the disparity 
between the initial threat of a still-unplanned air campaign and the demand that a Serbian 
leader cede effective sovereignty over Serbian territory. This apparent underestimation of 
the value of Kosovo, combined with an apparent Yugoslav underestimation of NATO 
resolve, created a significant disagreement over what concessions were reasonable. 
170 Perry, “View from Beijing,” 86. 
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The pricing of threat relief can occur in isolation, but is more credible with a basis 
in prior agreements. Unfortunately for NATO, previous negotiations had devalued the 
alliance’s threats. NATO had already threatened air attacks to secure a ceasefire between 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Yugoslav forces—the Holbrooke Agreement—
in October 1998.172 This agreement allowed unarmed monitors into Kosovo, a significant 
concession from Milosevic’s previous refusal of an outside presence, but it also 
established that NATO would settle for far less than was demanded at Rambouillet. In 
1999, NATO made similar threats as before, but demanded far more, so Milosevic 
initially had reason to believe they would compromise their demands. 
Coercion rarely targets a nation; it generally targets either a single leader or a 
small group of government officials, so the trade must be acceptable to them specifically, 
rather than merely acceptable to the nation as a whole. Withdrawing from Kosovo would 
impose a clear cost on Milosevic’s power and political future: folding without resistance 
would have likely guaranteed his loss in the next election or worse; political 
assassinations were not uncommon in Yugoslavia.173 Between the domestic threats, the 
low credibility of NATO’s threats, and his belief that NATO would compromise on its 
severe demands, concession was initially the worst of several options for Slobodan 
Milosevic. 
E. LIMIT THE TARGET’S OPTIONS 
Coercion is intended to cut straight to the postwar negotiations, as Schelling 
explains: “If there is no room for doubt how a contest in strength will come out, it may be 
possible to bypass the military stage altogether and to proceed at once to the coercive 
bargaining.”174 This is not to say that the target state must be powerless—coercion only 
happens when the target state still has options—but concession must be the preferred 
choice. The simplest way to make concession the best choice is for the coercer to limit 
the options a target state has left. 
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The first Yugoslav option was an attempt to counter-coerce by denial, seeking to 
deny NATO a military victory and inflict unacceptable losses on the strike aircraft. 
NATO planners expected and prepared for this; the first “measure of merit” for the air 
campaign was to minimize casualties to aircraft and crews.175 As General Clark recalls: 
“It drove our decisions on tactics, targets, and which airplanes could participate.… If we 
wanted to keep this campaign going indefinitely, we had to protect our air fleet.”176 
NATO’s efforts paid off, and Yugoslav defenders were only able to down two aircraft 
while NATO destroyed the majority of the Yugoslav air force.177 Surface to air missiles 
would remain a persistent operational nuisance, but not a politically noticeable threat. 
Failing to deny NATO militarily, Yugoslavs tried to break the alliance’s political 
cohesion by delaying, distracting, and otherwise giving wavering governments reasons to 
claim victory and cease bombing. This strategy was also expected by NATO political and 
military leaders, who agreed that “at the political level the measure of merit is to retain 
alliance solidarity and the full support of our regional partners.”178 At the military level, 
General Clark’s previous knowledge of bombing campaigns included study of Operation 
Rolling Thunder, the unsuccessful 1965–68 effort in Vietnam. A fixture of Rolling 
Thunder, which Clark desperately wanted to avoid, was a bombing pause. Some believed 
a pause “would serve as an inducement on the other side to begin the negotiations,” but 
Clark felt that “Milosevic and his generals knew exactly how to contact us if they wanted 
us to stop the bombing.”179 While NATO had not planned for a long campaign—
Secretary General Solana originally estimated “days, not months”—the alliance 
addressed its internal political concerns and publicly demonstrated a unified commitment 
to continue the bombing campaign until results were achieved.180 
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Vital to maintaining domestic support within NATO nations was the avoidance of 
civilian casualties or other politically unpopular effects, done through careful strike 
planning and the use of very precise munitions. Through the entire air campaign, civilian 
casualties were estimated around 500 dead, a low enough total that the deaths of 20 train 
passengers on the Grdelica Klisura railway bridge were a significant story.181 Even this 
limited collateral damage gave the Milosevic government hope that collapsing political 
support would end the bombing campaign. Had NATO lacked precision bombing 
capabilities, it would have been very difficult to maintain political support and control 
over the air campaign. 
In addition to attacking NATO’s cohesion, Milosevic attempted to gain the 
support of Russia, believing that Russia would intervene with sufficient influence to end 
the air campaign. Immediately after bombing began, Russian President Boris Yeltsin had 
issued a statement condemning the action, calling for Kosovo’s status to be resolved 
through negotiation and vaguely allowing for potential military action, so Milosevic 
could reasonably hope for more substantial support.182 
Russia was in significant financial trouble at the time, and needed to secure loans 
from the International Monetary Fund, but just as crucial was their need to protect their 
prestige on the world stage.183 Vladimir Putin, then Secretary of the Security Council of 
the Russian Federation, later insisted that Russia’s relationship with NATO relied on 
being “treated as an equal partner.”184 Russia’s cooperation with NATO would 
presumably be enough to keep future NATO interventions away from more vital Russian 
interests, such as the conflict then raging in Chechnya. Had Russia’s diplomatic outrage 
ever become more substantial, the situation could have changed in Milosevic’s favor, but 
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when Russia’s position changed, it was not in Yugoslavia’s favor: special envoy Viktor 
Chernomyrdin joined Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to present a NATO-crafted 
ceasefire agreement to Milosevic on June 3.185 
When Milosevic conceded to NATO’s demands in June 1999, he was not 
overpowered or in immediate personal danger, but he was out of options to control his 
and Yugoslavia’s fate. The Yugoslav military was intact but unable to prevent NATO’s 
continued bombing, and while strikes were relatively toothless against forces in Kosovo, 
strikes within Serbia were incredibly destructive to infrastructure, giving the alliance 
potential leverage to pressure Milosevic. These strikes were affecting the people: polling 
found that the number of Yugoslavs who “trusted Milosevic most” dropped from 30 
percent prewar to 15 percent immediately after the bombing stopped.186 Despite this, 
Milosevic still saw options until Russia compromised with NATO, and then he realized 
that concession was a foregone conclusion. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter established the basic issues a coercive strategy must address. In the 
absence of a planned strategy, tactical and operational events will probably produce one, 
but an incidental strategy is unlikely to be efficient or decisive. In Allied Force, NATO’s 
plan was weak and incomplete, giving the operational realities great opportunity to shape 
the strategy, rather than the other way around. Operational proficiency and skilled 
diplomacy would eventually make NATO’s threats credible and reduce Slobodan 
Milosevic’s options to the point that concession was the best choice, but there was more 
luck and coincidence than planning in NATO’s strategy. 
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VI. COERCION IN THE FUTURE
Operation Allied Force was the largest-scale instance of a coercive campaign, 
particularly among the successful cases, that the United States has been involved in the 
post-Cold War era. That makes it the best evidence for future coercion, within the 
circumstances of the case. This chapter will review what NATO—dominated by the 
United States—did well, what it did poorly, and provide recommendations for how Allied 
Force could have been fought more efficiently. 
That counterfactual case will not happen, though, so this chapter will also cover 
issues not tested in Allied Force, either because they were irrelevant to the case or 
because they did not exist yet. Since 1999, there have been great strides in military 
technology, both in the use of guided weapons by American forces and the proliferation 
of anti-access technologies to likely adversaries. In addition to the expansion and 
advancement of existing technologies, whole new categories of technology have been 
militarized, enabling new possibilities for operational mechanisms in coercion. These 
technological advances have overwhelmingly made strikes on military targets relatively 
harder and attacking civilian targets easier, so they also emphasize the legal issues with 
coercive uses of force. 
A. NATO’S PERFORMANCE IN ALLIED FORCE 
NATO dominated the skies of Yugoslavia, but struggled to bring this dominance 
down to ground level. Despite the substantial efforts devoted to fighting a ground war 
from the air, this effort ran counter to the core doctrine of the U.S. Air Force, which flew 
the vast majority of sorties in Allied Force, so results were limited. In areas where the 
campaign emphasized doctrinal strengths, like the bombing of strategic targets inside 
Serbia, the alliance performed extremely capably. Overall, NATO’s overwhelming force 
made the inelegance of its employment moot, but this success would have been 
incomplete without the vital diplomatic successes, bringing Russia into the NATO camp 
and also holding the alliance together. 
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B. ALLIED FORCE DONE BETTER – A COUNTERFACTUAL 
It is important to understand the limits of even the best strategy: it can maximize 
the results achieved in a given situation, but it cannot change the initial conditions. Given 
NATO’s demands and Slobodan Milosevic’s domestic political position, a concession 
would have been unlikely without actual violence, regardless of how well NATO’s 
operation was planned or how limited Milosevic’s options were. Even faced with only 
two options— resistance or concession—resistance would have carried fewer initial costs 
for Milosevic, and once bombs fell and blood was shed, domestic anger would have made 
concession even more politically costly. Had NATO’s operational efforts been of 
maximum efficiency, focusing on industrial targets, transportation, and the power grid of 
Serbia from the beginning, domestic support for Milosevic would have plausibly declined 
much faster and made accepting NATO’s demands the rational choice much earlier. 
In this author’s estimation, the best-case operation would have still taken 4 to 6 weeks to 
coerce Milosevic—better than the 11 weeks of the real Allied Force, but far longer than 
prewar estimates.187 
C. ADVANCES IN OFFENSIVE TECHNOLOGY 
Sensor and weapons technology has advanced dramatically since 1999, enabling 
great strides in hunting and killing mobile targets like the Yugoslav forces deployed to 
Kosovo, but much more modest gains in the ability to attack fixed targets. Allied Force 
featured the combat debuts of the B-2A Spirit stealth bomber and the GBU-31 Joint 
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), a combination which allowed the U.S. Air Force to 
deliver a 2000-lb bomb within 10 meters of any point in the world, unmolested by air 
defenses.188 This incredible capability for coercion by weakening has been difficult to 
improve upon: today’s JDAMs come in several sizes and can be dropped from virtually 
any aircraft in the U.S. inventory, but greater precision yields diminishing returns in 
attacks on fixed targets. 
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The most noticeable shift in the years—and wars—after Allied Force has been the 
expansion of the persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
capabilities needed to suppress an army from the sky. The MQ-1 Predator drone was 
developed in the mid-1990s and saw limited use in Allied Force, but today it is the 
ubiquitous face of American airpower over Afghanistan, Iraq, and numerous other 
countries.189 The perfusion of surveillance drones, targeting for a much broader array of 
guided weapons that can be carried by virtually any platform, leaves little technical 
reason for a modern airstrike to miss even a mobile target. The lessons learned about 
operational shortcomings in Allied Force have been heavily studied by the U.S. Air 
Force. Had today’s capabilities been available against Yugoslav vehicles in 1999, NATO 
would have found more of them and hit many more of them, making the attempt at 
coercion by denial more operationally efficient, although still strategically misguided. 
D. ADVANCES IN DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGY 
Unfortunately for any attempts to re-fight the 1999 campaign, other nations also 
studied Allied Force. The bombing campaign was only possible due to the weakness of 
Yugoslav air defenses, so nations opposed to the United States are purchasing advanced 
missile systems like the Russian S-300.190 These longer-ranged SAMs are complemented 
by complex deception plans using advanced decoys, GPS jammers, and target dispersal to 
complicate any U.S. bombing campaign. NATO aircraft carrying air-to-surface weapons 
only comprised about 14,000 of 38,004 total sorties in Allied Force, and only three-
quarters of that 14,000 were strike sorties, the remainder being flown to suppress air 
defenses.191 The sortie breakdown will be weighted even further against strike missions 
as ISR sorties expand—they were only 5 percent of U.S. Air Force sorties in Allied 
Force.192 The United States continues to develop ways around anti-access technologies, 
189 “MQ-1B Predator,” United States Air Force, September 23, 2015, 
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104469/mq1bpredator.aspx. 
190 Alexander Natruskin, “Iran Plans to Sign Contract for Russian S-300 Missiles Next Week,” 
Reuters, August 18, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/18/us-russia-iran-arms-
idUSKCN0QN11B20150818.  
191 Department of Defense, After-Action Report, 68–69, Figures 13 and 14; “Operation Allied Force,” 
United States Air Force. 
192 “Operation Allied Force,” United States Air Force. 
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but every support asset increases the cost and difficulty to drop each bomb, so it is 
imperative that future operations make every bomb count. 
E. NEW CATEGORIES OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 
In addition to making existing categories of ordnance more effective, military 
scientists are also continually researching new categories of weapon, and the most 
notable introduction since Allied Force was kinetic cyberwarfare. Making a public debut 
with the discovery of the Stuxnet virus damaging centrifuges in Iran’s nuclear program, 
such precise cyberweapons offer the possibility of extremely discriminating, covert 
attacks. Unfortunately, these weapons still require very specific tailoring to function—
Stuxnet is believed to have been tested on centrifuges in Israel identical to the ones it 
targeted in Iran—and therefore must remain covert to be effective, eliminating most of 
their usefulness as a coercive threat.193 
F. LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN COERCION 
All mechanisms become coercive when they are used to hurt rather than confining 
themselves to a contest of military force, raising questions about the principles of military 
necessity and humanity under the laws of war.194 Most historical cases of coercion 
sidestep these issues by occurring (often unintentionally) within a conventional war, so it 
is unclear where actions toward strictly military aims end and coercive actions begin, but 
this historical solution is unhelpful for planned coercive efforts in the future. 
In his memoir of the conflict, General Clark insists that attacking Yugoslav 
ground forces “was a political, legal, and moral necessity” because the intervention in 
Kosovo was being justified on humanitarian grounds: “How could we morally justify not 
striking at the Serbs on the ground, if we had the ability to do so?”195 Unfortunately, 
                                                 
193 William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger, “Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in 
Iran Nuclear Delay,” New York Times, January 15, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html?_r=0. 
194 The principles of the law of war are discussed in U.S. Department of Defense, Law of War 
Manual, (Washington, DC: June 12, 2015), 50–69, 
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Law-of-War-Manual-June-2015.pdf.  
195 Clark, Waging Modern War, 241. 
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ineffective attacks on troops in Kosovo diverted resources from strikes inside Serbia 
which could have shortened the conflict, thereby limiting the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. 
Future campaigns will have to address this divergence between ruthlessly effective 
coercive targeting, which maximizes suffering in hopes of a shorter conflict, and force 
scrupulously focused to minimize damage outside of immediate military necessity, which 
would limit violence to the battlefield but allow the enemy to fight far longer. There is no 
easy way to address this, other than intensive planning before the conflict begins. 
G. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Clausewitz insists that “the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman 
and commander have to make is to establish … the kind of war on which they are 
embarking.”196 This precept has been proven correct by history, and it carries two points 
that are vital to success in coercion. First, strategy must be produced jointly by politicians 
and generals to ensure that military plans will achieve political ends, that political ends 
are achievable with the forces allocated, and that each group understands the other’s 
intent. This planning must incorporate both groups at all stages, and must plan out every 
phase of the war with all contingencies: ideally, coercion makes actual violence 
unnecessary because there is no way the coercer will not win.  
Second, planning for coercion must establish the parameters of the conflict, which 
are as much about the target as the coercer: the plan must determine who (in the target 
state) will be coerced, what is to be demanded, and how the coercer will apply sufficient 
leverage to the target to make concession preferable to resistance. Pressuring actors who 
lack the power to deliver the coercer’s demands will not succeed, regardless of the 
pressure applied. In the same vein, demands that would carry overwhelming costs for the 
actor surrendering them will fail, regardless of their overall cost to the target state. 
Selecting a target actor with the power to deliver and determining how much concession 
would cost them is the first part of planning coercion, but equally vital is knowing how 
much force will be needed to apply pressure, determining how much force is available, 
and adjusting demands as necessary. 
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This planning must take place at the political level, outside the military command 
structure even though senior officers will be involved, because military officers in 
isolation tend to hew to their service doctrine regardless of the situation, as was 
demonstrated in Allied Force. This is not to suggest that service doctrine is incorrect or 
harmful, but that expecting generals to act outside their service cultures is historically 
unwise. Therefore, one necessary strategic choice is the appointment of a commander, 
specifically chosen for the kind of war being planned. Allied Force—an operation 
dominated by the U.S. Air Force—was commanded by a U.S. Army general simply 
because he was Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, at the time, and the initial strategy 
correspondingly reflected an Army point of view. Appointing an Air Force general would 
not alone have been a strategy, but would have led to more efficient operational 
employment of airpower. 
Coercion is not a military operational field, so there are no doctrinal publications 
that address the topic at the strategic level. The most applicable military publication is 
probably Field Manual 3–24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, which 
emphasizes tactics and principles to gain popular cooperation rather than seizing 
objectives by force. The principles of legitimacy and unified civil-military action are very 
applicable to coercion: coercive diplomacy can only occur within a framework that both 
parties accept, and coercion can only succeed when there is a unified solution between 
the political and military commanders.197 Coercion is the epitome of “political 
intercourse, carried on with other means,” and so both politicians and masters of the other 
means—the military—must be intimately involved.198 
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